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Abstract 
This paper empirically estimates disaggregated crime categories for Sabah from 1968 to 
2006. The criminometric analysis incorporated in a within sample analysis of cointegration 
and error correction framework and the beyond sample analysis using the decompositions of 
variance. Our findings suggest that any support for the deterrence hypothesis is sensitive to 
the inclusion of prison or courts related variables. In the long run we find that only robbery is 
exogenous in all crime model tested however, the beyond sample estimation proves that in 
longer time period of approximately 50 years the post-sample dynamic VDCs imply that a 
substantial portion of the variance of the forecast error of these crime are explained by their 
explanatory variables. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Crime is a by-product of development (Meera, 1993) in which societies are 
becoming more materialistic and anomistic. Anomie can be referred to as “normless” 
state where individuals’ goals are more important than the means adopted to attain them, 
and it is likely to be a feature of periods of rapid economic or social change. Barlow 
(1984) pointed out that under those conditions where anomie is prevalent; all types of 
crime may be expected to rise in the society including non-pecuniary crimes like rape 
and murder (Meera, 1990). Since growth and development are concerned with 
economists and policy makers, so do crime. Crime or the non-compliance attitude of 
individuals can be viewed as negative externality with destructive power. 
 
Economics of crime emerged from the economics’ basic problem of efficient 
utilization of scarce resources for maximum benefits towards individuals or societies. 
Crime on one strand can be viewed as the outcome of inefficient resource allocation of 
developing countries. It is inevitable that in the midst of development and globalization 
crime comes hand in hand with other socio-demographic problems. Table 1 shows 
Malaysia’s HDI, GDP and crime rates from 1980 up to 2006. It is obvious that Human 
Development Index (HDI), Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and crime in Malaysia are 
increasing. HDI are an index measuring the development phase of a country. A general 
view from Table 1 will definitely support the hypothesis that crime are by- product of 
development.  
 
  
Table 1: Malaysia’s HDI, GDP and Crime trends 1980 - 2011 
Year HDI GDP Crime Rate 
1980 0.559 54.29 70745 
1985 0.600 78.89 89165 
1990 0.631 119.08 68488 
1995 0.674 225.83 81183 
2000 0.705 356.40 167130 
2005 0.738 522.45 157365 
Sources: Human Development Report, 2011 
 
Arguments prevail as of why economics of crime and critics towards rational 
choice theory adapted to crime and criminology in an economic perspective (for detailed 
explanations on criticism towards rational choice theory see, Ulen, 1999). It is important 
to note that, crime “contribute” to the economy from two strands. While crime activities 
robs part of a nation’s income for its control is one strands, increasing loss of future 
economic production is another. Both a nation’s income and the demolition of its future 
economic production are important measure for policy makers thus giving economists’ 
concern over increasing crime rate in a country. In the case of Malaysia, crime staggered 
to the peak of the nation’s policy agenda under the National Key Results Areas (NKRA) 
in 2010 and reducing crime was one of the important elements in providing better 
security for the people. 
 
Malaysian Vision 2020 which aims to attain fully developed nation status by the 
year 2020 was carried out through encouraging economic growth, enhancing small and 
medium enterprise development, increasing public-private partnerships and attracting 
targeted high-quality foreign direct investment forget or neglected the social norms or 
values embedded in the lives of their people. Here is where anomie comes into picture 
portrayed by increasing crime rate over the years of economic progress in Malaysia with 
its highly capitalistic mission. Crime in Malaysia are increasing by leaps and bounds 
since the past 20 years (Hamzah and Lau, 2011) and evidence are everywhere in the 
mass media, printed and electronic, alike. Meera (1993) while explaining Malaysian 
public expenditure on the criminal-justice system highlighted that, growth in crime rates 
would sooner or later become a threat to the society and feeling of insecurity may prevail 
and it may take a somewhat long time to become obvious or to be noticed. It is proven 
these days that across the nation, societies are crying for peace and security depositing 
the government into unrest and forcing them to increase police force, review its training 
programme and develop new security policies to increase safety measures in Malaysia. 
From an economics of crime’s view it is not the best trained police force which will 
decrease crime rates in a highly capitalistic and materialistic society (Teh, 2008); it is the 
improvement in the imbalances of the economic system.      
 
This study intend to make a humble attempt in finding relationship between crime 
and economic determinants while at the same time proving the effectiveness of existing 
law and enforcement strategy in Sabah. Sabah’s fluid cultural, social and economic 
boundaries with both Indonesia and the  Philippines renders the role of national 
identities, citizenship and formal economic networks less important than the informal 
transnational networks that facilitates the flow of commodities and humans across 
boundaries, often undetected by the Malaysian/Sabahan state apparatus. These 
undetected activities are said to be root cause for increasing Sabah’s crime rates in recent 
years which event called for a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to be signed 
between the Sabah National Unity and Integration Department (NUID) and districts’ 
police in order to reduce crime rates in the district level. The rest of the papers is 
constructed as follows with section 2 provides the discussion on the literature review, 
section 3 illustrates the methodology used for the analysis, section 4 present the results 
and section 5 conclude the overall findings.  
2. Literature Review  
 
Meera (1990; 1993) in his study highlighted that increasingly larger amount of 
resources per head are being spent from public resources to control crime in Malaysia. 
However, the share of public expenditure on economic costs for crime control had been 
constant and does not burden the nation for the period studied. The effect of crime 
activities are extensive and far reaching to beyond the injury and loss suffered by victims 
during the crime (Keng, 2006). The costs incurred by victims as results of victimization, 
government allocation for efficient law enforcement and individual or organizations 
precautionary movements are all the sum of costs from criminal activities. Government 
plays an important role in implementing efficient law enforcement for a nation because 
crime is a costly social phenomenon that can leads to paralyzed economy, political 
turbulences and social morality problems. 
 
Elsewhere in the literature, Malaysia became important country for analysis of 
crime in criminology (Moss, 1997), blue water crime (Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998), 
policing (Sidhu, 2005; Sidhu, 2006; Teh, 2008) and economics (Meera and Jayakumar, 
1995; Habibullah and Baharom, 2009; Baharom and Habibullah, 2009; Tang, 2009; Tang 
2011 and Hamzah and Lau, 2011). All studies, at best, provide mixture finding for crime 
in Malaysia. Meera and Jayakumar (1995) found that crimes in Malaysia are generally 
motivated by economic factors. All crime categories are also found to exhibit long-run 
relationship with economic conditions (Habibullah and Baharom, 2009) however fails to 
portray cointegration with income inequality (Baharom and Habibullah, 2009). When 
testing for crime, inflation and unemployment, Tang (2009) concluded that there are 
positive relationship between unemployment and inflation with crime in the long-run. 
The finding holds even when tourists’ arrivals are incorporated in the crime model 
(Tang, 2011). Employing a panel analysis of 14 states in Malaysia, Hamzah and Lau 
(2011) identified that all crime categories are negatively related to unemployment. 
However, no studies - as far as the authors are aware of - that analyse deterrence 
hypothesis in Malaysia.  
 
Studies on economics of crime are wide-ranging differentiated by types of data 
used, methodological choices and geographical situation of the case studied. However, 
consensus on the support for economics of crime theory had never been achieved. 
Ehrlich (1977) contends that the possibility of bias due to omitted variable bias never can 
be denied however, it is impossible to capture all variables that are said to be the 
influence in increasing crime rates (see Masih and Masih, 1996 and Kelaher and 
Sarafidis, 2011 for examples). Omitted variable bias are also been accused as the reasons 
for conflicting results obtained in the literature of economics of crime. According to 
Mustard (2003), conviction rate and time served are theoretically important but often 
neglected in economics of crime analysis. This can generates omitted variable bias if in 
reality those neglected variables are indeed correlated with arrest rate. This study will 
analyse crime in econometric model of supply and deterrence to overcome existing 
shortage of deterrence analysis tested in Malaysia. 
 
 
 
 
  
3. Econometric Methodology 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Becker (1968) starts the supply of offences model with economists’ usual analysis of 
choice and assumes that a person commits an offence if the utility he could get by using his 
time and other resources at other activities. Dumped by theories of determinants of crime 
from various field of studies, Becker (1968) pointed out that, “Practically, all the diverse 
theories agree, however, that when other variables are held constant, an increase in a 
person’s probability of conviction or punishment if convicted will generally decrease, 
perhaps substantially, perhaps negligibly, the number of offenses he commits.” to support the 
model of economics of crime.  
 
According to Becker (1968), assume an availability of more legal jobs in the market, 
increase in population knowledge will decrease the incentive to enter illegal market thus 
reducing number of offences. Same goes to changes in punishment meted out by the 
government or policy changes related to punishment, for example, imposing more severe 
punishment for particular offence would tend to reduce the number of offenses, according to 
Becker at least temporarily since they cannot be committed while going under punishment. 
Thus, the individual’s expected utility, E[U] from committing an offence would be: 
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where Uj is the individual’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, pj is the subjective 
probability of being caught and convicted, Yj is the monetary plus psychic income or 
monetary equivalent from an offence and fj the monetary equivalent of the punishment. 
Improvements made in Ehrlich (1973) from Becker’s economics model of crime are 
numerous which later became among the most influential papers in economics of crime 
literature. First, it assumes that criminals now have the choice between costs and gains from 
legitimate and illegitimate industries and support the new model with existing empirical 
evidence. Secondly, the models relates the theory of participation in illegitimate activities 
with the general theory of occupational choices hence it can helps economists predict both the 
direction and relative magnitude of the response of specific offenders to changes in various 
observable opportunities. The model also allows differentiation between the deterrent and 
preventive effects of punishment by imprisonment and permits the empirical investigation to 
gauge the deterrent effects alone. Lastly, Ehrlich (1973) analyzes the interaction between 
offense and defence using simultaneous-equation model to test the model empirically. The 
supply of offences equation by Ehrlich (1973) after the modification of separating 
quantifiable and non-quantifiable behavioural function can be written as follows: 
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where #$%& represent the crime rates for a given category, i;  , 	 and 	 are the arithmetic 
means of the monetary components of costs of punishment, income from illegitimate 
activities and income from legitimate activities; V is a vector of environmental variables and 
Z summarizes the effect of psychic and other non-quantifiable variables on the crime rate. 
 
Assuming that individual’s taste for crime was either proportional to some of the 
quantifiable variables affecting crime, or uncorrelated in the natural logarithms with all the 
explanatory variable, Ehrlich (1973) specify a stochastic function of the supply of offences 
function as follows; 
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where, A is a constant and µ stands for random errors of measurement and other stochastic 
effects and is assumed to have a normal distribution. The study of Ehrlich (1973) goes on 
until Ehrlich (1996) where he explained the basic misconception on the positive and negative 
incentives faced by potential criminals in their decision making process. It is believed that 
deterrence hypothesis only applied to negative incentives while positive incentives are useful 
in determining crime level and reducing it where possible. These understanding of positive 
and negative incentives are wrong since Ehrlich (1996) spelled out that, “The deterrence 
hypothesis and its logical extension - the market model - rely on the marginal efficacy of both 
positive and negative incentives and on the interaction between market demand and supply 
forces, to explain the observed variability in the frequency of offenses across space and 
time”. 
 
Following Becker (1968) and its extension in Ehrlich (1973), this paper estimates 
following models of economics of crime for deterrence and determinants analysis in Sabah 
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where -. refers to the crime rate; 	. is the GDP that represents the legitimate income level; 
.  is the unemployment rate which is the proxy for gains from illegitimate activities and time 
to allocate into illegitimate activities; -4. is the number of cases disposed by high court, 
56. is the imprisonment rate and 7-. are the recidivism rate as proxy to estimates the 
efficiency of law enforcement strategies. The number of cases disposed by high court, 
imprisonment and recidivism are also deterrence variables which will explain the deterrence 
role played by Sabah’s law enforcement strategies.  
 
Estimation Procedures 
 
1. Cointegration Analysis 
Cointegration technique explains the long-run relationship between two or more 
variables. Two or more variables are said to be cointegrated when they share a 
common trends and this imply that variables in the system exhibit a long-run 
relationships among them. However, cointegration only indicates the presence or 
absence of causal relationship among variables in a system and the results does not 
indicate any direction of causality between variables. This study employs 
cointegration analysis developed by Johansen and Juselius (1988, 1990) to determine 
the long-run relationship properties of the crime model.  
 
2. Vector Error Correction Modelling (VECM) & Causality Test 
Engle and Granger (1987) illutrated that once a number of variables (say, x and y) are 
found to be cointegrated, there always exists a corresponding error correction 
representation which suggests that changes in the dependent variable are a function of 
the level of disequilibrium in the cointegrating relationship (captured by the error 
correction term) as well as changes in other explanatory variables. Masih and Masih 
(1996) elaborated that the error correction approach are incorporated of both short- 
and long-run components. It could be seen as capturing the short-run dynamics of the 
system, whilst incorporating the long-run equilibrium suggested by theory (Dolado et 
al., 1990). A consequence of ECM is that either ∆xt or ∆yt or both must be caused by 
89:1 which is itself a function of ;9:1, <9:1. Intuitively, if yt and xt have a common 
trend, then the current change in xt is partly the result of xt moving into alignment with 
the trend value of its independent variables (yt). Through the error correction term, the 
ECM opens up an additional channel for Granger causality (ignored by the standard 
Granger, 1969 and Sims, 1972 tests) to emerge. VECM model allows Granger 
causality to be analysed through the error correction terms which were neglected in 
standard Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) tests. The Granger causality or endogeneity 
properties of the dependent variables are evidenced through the statistical significance 
of the t-test of the lagged error correction term and/or the F-test applied to the joint 
significance of the sum of the lags of each explanatory variable. The non-significance 
of these tests in opposite indicates the econometric exogeneity of the variables 
estimated.  
 
3. Variance Decompositions (VDCs) 
All the estimation procedures explained earlier can be inferred as within-sample 
estimations which only carter for the variables relationship within the sample period 
analysed. This weakness can be fixed using variance decompositions (VDCs) analysis 
which may be termed as out-of-sample causality tests. VDCs partitioned the variance 
of the forecast error of certain variables (crime categories for this study) into 
proportions attributable to shocks in each variable in the system including its own, 
provides an indication of these relatives. According to Sims (1982), variables that are 
optimally forecast from its own lagged values will have all its forecast error variance 
accounted for by its own disturbances. 
 
  
4. Results & Discussion 
 
The model estimated for this study consists of six variables: different types of crime rates 
(CR)
3
, GDP, unemployment (UE), number of cases disposed by high court (CD), 
imprisonment rates (IMP) and recidivism rates (REC). It is important to note that the 
level of crime in any society are determined by many differing and interrelated 
influences which is impossible to be incorporated in a single quantitative model in this 
study. Thus, the incorporation of the variables for this study is chosen partly due to the 
availability of the data for the region studied and partly based on the theories discussed 
in previous section.  
 
A wide range of unit root tests was applied preceding the Johansen and Jesulius’s (1990) 
multivariate cointegration tests to test the number of times a variable is differenced in 
order to turn it to stationarity
4
. Tests indicated that all variables were non-stationary at 
the `level’ form but stationary after `first differencing’. It can be concluded that all the 
variables in the system estimated were I(1). This is a pre-requisite for econometric 
analysis before the test of cointegration of the variables.  
 
The results based on Johansen’s (1988) and Johansen and Jesulius’s (1990) multivariate 
cointegration tests (Table 1) tend to suggest that these six variables are cointegrated or 
said to have common trends. In other words, all these six variables are bound together by 
long-run equilibrium relationships as indicated by the test of null or alternative 
hypotheses through the maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics. Interesting result was 
found in total crime model where only trace tests of the Johansen and Juselius 
                                                
3
 Crime rates are divided into few categories namely, Robbery, Housebreaking, Theft and Total Crime. 
4 Results for unit root tests are not provided due to space and available upon request. 
cointegeration test shows the existence of single contegrating vectors whilst maximum 
eigenvalue favour no long run relationship hypothesis. Conflicting results may occur in 
cointegration analysis and in this study we conclude that trace test are in favour and 
summarize that one cointegrating vector exists in the crime against property and total 
crime model. The conclusion was based on few studies that prefer trace tests as 
advantageous over maximum eigenvalue tests. Lütkepohl et. al. (2001) compared the 
properties of a range of maximum eigenvalue and trace tests for cointegrating rank of a 
vector autoregressive process. In a small sample size comparison, they conclude that 
trace tests are more robust than the maximum eigenvalue tests.   
 
This evidence of cointegration is a departure from related literature for Malaysian case 
(Moss, 1997; Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998; Sidhu, 2005; Sidhu, 2006; Teh, 2008; Meera 
and Jayakumar, 1995; Habibullah and Baharom, 2009; Baharom and Habibullah, 2009; 
Tang, 2009; Tang 2011 and Hamzah and Lau, 2011) which neglected the incorporation 
of deterrence variables in their economics of crime model. The application of the 
multivariate testing procedure (Johansen, 1988 and Johansen and Juselius, 1990), which 
is an improvement on the Engle-Granger procedure, by incorporating some other 
theoretically backed deterrence variables, demonstrates that all these six variables are 
tied together by long-run equilibrium relationship(s) in the case of Sabah. The number of 
cointegrating relationships found in (Table 1) will result in a corresponding number of 
residual series, and hence error correction term (ECTs), to be analysed in the following 
error correction model (VECM). 
 
  
Table 1: Johansen & Juselius’s Test for Multiple Cointegrating Vectors 
Vector 
Including: 
Hypotheses Test Statistics 
Robbery 
k=1, r=1 
H0 HA λmax Trace 
r = 0 r = 1 57.04* 114.40* 
r ≤ 1 r = 2 26.43 57.35 
r ≤ 2 r = 3 18.02 30.92 
r ≤ 3 r = 4 8.05 12.90 
r ≤ 4 r = 5 4.61 4.84 
r ≤ 5 r = 6 0.23 0.23 
Housebreaking 
k=1, r=1 
H0 HA λmax Trace 
r = 0 r = 1 81.19* 168.18* 
r ≤ 1 r = 2 30.02 86.99 
r ≤ 2 r = 3 32.12 56.97 
r ≤ 3 r = 4 25.82 37.11 
r ≤ 4 r = 5 19.3 20.56 
r ≤ 5 r = 6 12.52 8.07 
Theft 
k=3, r=1 
H0 HA λmax Trace 
r = 0 r = 1 38.91* 84.77* 
r ≤ 1 r = 2 30.44 45.85 
r ≤ 2 r = 3 13.55 27.18 
r ≤ 3 r = 4 8.31 13.64 
r ≤ 4 r = 5 4.63 5.33 
r ≤ 5 r = 6 0.69 0.69 
Total 
k=2, r=1 
H0 HA λmax Trace 
r = 0 r = 1 33.02 92.80* 
r ≤ 1 r = 2 24.93 59.77 
r ≤ 2 r = 3 21.31 34.84 
r ≤ 3 r = 4 7.27 13.53 
r ≤ 4 r = 5 4.79 6.26 
r ≤ 5 r = 6 1.47 1.47 
Notes: Asterisks (*) denote statistically significant at 5% level. k is the lag length and r is the number of 
cointegrating vectors(s). The test uses 95 critical values for all disaggregated crime group sourced from 
Johansen and Juselius (1990).  
 
 
As stated earlier, cointegration cannot detect the direction of causality which in turn will be 
done by an analysis of results based on estimating ECTs in error correction model (Table 2). 
All robbery, housebreaking, theft and total crime model tend to prove the existence of 
cointegrating relationships in the system. Following tables in this section will illustrate the 
results for granger causality test in the first three columns and the last two column will 
summarize the error correction terms (ECTs) found from vector error correction model 
(VECM) utilized for models with long-run relationship found previously in Johansen’s 
(1988) and Johansen and Juselius’s (1990) multivariate cointegration tests.  
Relative contributions of the explanatory variables in explaining any shocks in the dependent 
variable (each category of crime) for the time period afar from the sample period studied will 
be conducted using decompositions of variance presented in Table 3. Granger causality 
relationships are illustrated in Figure 1 for clear view of causal relationship exists among the 
variables studied in each crime model. The focal aim of this study is the temporal dynamic 
effects of deterrence and economic factors on various types of crime. Thus, results are 
restricted in explaining that aspects only in particular although many other interesting insights 
could be gained from it. 
 
Robbery Panel 1 of Table 2 shows results for robbery crime model. Results derived from the 
VECM indicate that robbery remains econometrically exogenous or unexplained by the 
explanatory variables incorporated. This is proven by the non-significance of both the F-test 
and t-test of the analysis. GDP are the endogenous variables in the system which will bear the 
burden of short-run adjustment (to long term trend) in order to bring the system back to long-
term equilibrium. It will take approximately 2.94 years for the system to revert to the 
equilibrium through GDP. However, the post- sample dynamic VDCs in Table 3 imply that a 
substantial portion of the variance of the forecast error of robbery (say, at 50-year horizons) is 
explained by GDP (34.15%), unemployment (6.65%), number of cases disposed (13.91%), 
imprisonment (6.73%) and recidivism (32%).     
 
  
Table 2: Temporal Causality Results Based on VECM 
Dependent 
Variable 
∆crime ∆gdp ∆ue ∆cdis ∆imp ∆rec ECT1 
X 
2
- statistics (p-value) coefficient 
 Robbery  
∆crime  
- 
2.36 
(.12) 
0.77 
(.38) 
0.01 
(.93) 
0.74 
(.39) 
1.01 
(.31) 
-.23 
[-1.09] 
∆gdp 5.60 
(.02)* 
- 
0.09 
(.76) 
1.39 
(.24) 
0.01 
(.94) 
7.17 
(.01)* 
-.34* 
[-3.57] 
∆ue 0.37 
(.54) 
0.98 
(.32) 
- 
1.73 
(.19) 
2.31 
(.13) 
0.10 
(.75) 
-.41 
[-045] 
∆cdis 
0.20 
(.65) 
1.44 
(.23) 
10.2 
(.00)* 
- 
0.09 
(.76) 
0.00 
(.95) 
.72 
[1.88] 
∆imp 
0.73 
(.39) 
2.84 
(.09)** 
0.78 
(.38) 
2.35 
(.13) 
- 
0.51 
(.47) 
-.51 
[-1.92] 
∆rec 
3.11 
(.08)** 
4.34 
(.04)* 
0.39 
(.53) 
0.00 
(.97) 
0.52 
(.47) 
- 
.21 
[0.54] 
 Housebreaking 
∆crime  
- 
3.30 
(.07)** 
0.08 
(.78) 
0.00 
(.99) 
0.39 
(.53) 
0.77 
(.38) 
-.06 
[-.38] 
∆gdp 0.13 
(.73) 
- 
0.16 
(.69) 
0.04 
(.84) 
0.00 
(.95) 
0.01 
(.93) 
.07 
[1.27] 
∆ue 2.42 
(.12) 
0.42 
(.52) 
- 
0.76 
(.38) 
1.25 
(.26) 
1.03 
(.31) 
.88 
[1.79] 
∆cdis 0.05 
(.82) 
0.43 
(.51) 
9.23 
(.00)* 
- 
1.46 
(.23) 
0.41 
(.52) 
.26 
[1.15] 
∆imp 3.80 
(.05)** 
1.60 
(.21) 
0.01 
(.92) 
0.07 
(.79) 
- 
1.41 
(.24) 
-.51* 
[-4.36] 
∆rec 2.89 
(.09)** 
1.96 
(.16) 
3.01 
(.08)** 
0.21 
(.65) 
0.90 
(.34) 
- 
-.42 
[-1.94] 
 Theft 
∆crime  
- 
0.04 
(.84) 
2.32 
(.13) 
1.21 
(.27) 
5.92 
(.02)* 
0.11 
(.75) 
-.04 
[-.65] 
∆gdp 2.96 
(.09)** 
- 
0.49 
(.48) 
0.18 
(.68) 
0.48 
(.49) 
1.33 
(.16) 
-.07 
[-1.84] 
∆ue 0.28 
(.60) 
0.03 
(.86) 
- 
2.59 
(.11) 
2.21 
(.14) 
0.27 
(.61) 
.24 
[.66] 
∆cdis 0.36 
(.55) 
0.00 
(.98) 
5.33 
(.02)* 
- 
1.97 
(.16) 
0.08 
(.78) 
.32 
[2.17] 
∆imp 2.67 
(.10) 
6.14 
(.01)* 
3.30 
(.07)** 
2.57 
(.11) 
- 
0.57 
(.45) 
-.27* 
[-2.90] 
∆rec 3.00 
(.08)** 
0.09 
(.76) 
0.47 
(.49) 
0.31 
(.58) 
0.38 
(.54) 
- 
-.23 
[-1.53] 
 Total Crime 
∆crime  
- 
0.23 
(.63) 
2.14 
(.14) 
1.28 
(.26) 
2.64 
(.10) 
1.98 
(.16) 
-.46* 
[-4.93] 
∆gdp 0.65 
(.42) 
- 
0.46 
(.50) 
0.12 
(.73) 
0.49 
(.49) 
0.68 
(.41) 
.08 
[.96] 
∆ue 0.66 
(.42) 
0.27 
(.60) 
- 
1.03 
(.31) 
0.61 
(.43) 
0.27 
(.60) 
-.92 
[-1.27] 
∆cdis 3.27 
(.07)** 
0.37 
(.54) 
9.78 
(.00)* 
- 
0.55 
(.46) 
2.33 
(.13) 
.19 
[.61] 
∆imp 0.14 
(.71) 
2.43 
(.12) 
0.25 
(.62) 
1.03 
(.31) 
- 
0.26 
(.61) 
-.05 
[-.24] 
∆rec 0.01 
(.93) 
1.16 
(.28) 
2.31 
(.13) 
0.13 
(.72) 
0.11 
(.75) 
- 
-.32 
[-.99] 
The ECTs were derived by normalizing the one or more cointegrating vectors on respective crime variables 
resulting in r number of residuals. Asterisks * indicate significance at the 5% levels. Figures in parenthesis () 
are the probability of short-run adjustment and [] are the t-statistics of the corresponding error correction terms 
(ECTs). 
Housebreaking The within-sample VECM results (Panel 2 of Table 2) shows that 
housebreaking Granger cause GDP in the short run thus proving the endogeneity of the 
dependent variable at least through the F-test applied to the joint significance of the lags of 
each explanatory variable. However, imprisonment are most endogenous since it can Granger 
cause housebreaking in the short-run and bear the burden of short-run adjustment of around 2 
years to bring the system back into equilibrium states. The VDCs (Table 3) on the other hand 
shows that housebreaking are econometrically exogenous since even after 50 years horizon 
about 85% of the shocks in housebreaking are explained by its own shocks. Housebreaking, 
although is crime related to property, have violent forces in it in the sense that house owner or 
victim are brutalized in the event of housebreaking. It is expected that factors affecting 
crimes with violent forces will not have immediate impact but will accumulate over time. 
Results show that it takes longer period of time for the interaction of all the independent 
variables to manifest in the form of housebreaking or crime with violent forces. 
 
Theft Results based on VECM for theft (Panel 3 of Table 2) crime model are similar to that of 
housebreaking. The estimate indicates that theft Granger-caused imprisonment in the short 
run as evidenced through the significance of the F-test for the theft-imprisonment rate. The 
burden of short-run adjustment falls to imprisonment rate and it will take around 3.70 years 
for the system to revert to its equilibrium level. The VDCs (Table 3) also shows that theft is 
explained by its own shocks (89.45%) even after the 50-years horizon beyond the sample 
period estimated. 
 
Total Crime Results based on the VECM (Panel 8 of Table 2) indicates that in the short-run, 
although individually the explanatory variables did not significantly Granger-cause the 
homicide rate (as reflected in the non-significance of the F-tests of the lags of the explanatory 
variables), the proportion by which the total crime rate adjusted endogeneously in the short-
run to its long-term equilibrium relationship with other cointegrating variables is nevertheless 
significant. In other words, the short run disequilibrium in the long-run cointegrating 
relationship did Granger cause the total crime rate. Approximately, it will take 2.17 years for 
the system to revert back into the equilibrium states. For the post-sample estimation, in the 
long-run (say, 50-years horizon) shocks in other independent variables explain about 87.36% 
of the shocks in total crime rates in Sabah. 
 
Table 3: Variance Decompositions (VDCs) 
 Percentage of forecast variance explained by innovations in: 
Years 
Crime rate GDP Unemployment 
Number of 
cases 
disposed 
Imprisonment Recidivism 
Robbery 
1 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 27.82 28.06 6.52 10.27 5.39 21.93 
20 12.94 32.42 6.67 12.80 6.34 28.83 
30 9.10 33.46 6.66 13.47 6.58 30.73 
40 7.45 33.91 6.65 13.76 6.68 31.55 
50 6.55 34.15 6.65 13.91 6.73 32.00 
 Housebreaking 
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 86.15 12.10 0.09 0.00 0.04 1.61 
20 85.36 12.88 0.09 0.00 0.02 1.65 
30 85.09 13.13 0.10 0.00 0.01 1.66 
40 84.96 13.26 0.10 0.00 0.01 1.67 
50 84.89 13.34 0.10 0.00 0.01 1.67 
 Theft 
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 90.35 0.98 0.96 4.07 1.58 2.05 
20 89.81 0.55 0.51 5.36 1.30 2.47 
30 89.61 0.40 0.35 5.82 1.20 2.62 
40 89.51 0.32 0.26 6.05 1.15 2.70 
50 89.45 0.28 0.22 6.19 1.12 2.74 
 Total Crime 
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 17.69 2.51 56.60 2.64 20.39 0.18 
20 14.35 2.35 59.71 2.79 20.64 0.15 
30 13.38 2.31 60.62 2.83 20.72 0.15 
40 12.91 2.28 61.06 2.85 20.75 0.14 
50 12.64 2.27 61.31 2.86 20.77 0.14 
Notes: Figures in the first column refer to horizons (i.e. number of years). All other figures are estimates rounded to two 
decimal places - rounding errors may prevent perfect percentage decomposition in some cases. Several alternative orderings 
of these variables were also tried with crime rates appearing after policy and economic variables. Such alterations, however, 
did not alter the results to any substantial degree. This is possibly due to the variance – covariance matrix of residuals being 
near diagonal, arrived at through Choleski decomposition in order to orthogonalize the innovations across equations. 
 
 
Results from Granger-causality tests are presented in figure 1 for clearer view and ease of 
understanding. The short-run Granger causality analysis also provides some insights to 
related crime model analyzed in this study. It is significant that number of
disposed for all the crime categories involved are the Granger cause of unemployment. This 
can be attributed to the efficiency of number of criminal cases disposed which in turn will 
increase or decrease the imprisonment rate will likely cau
increase or decrease due to the prejudice issues of employer. 
 
Figure 1: Granger Causality Relationship (
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THEFT 
Notes:   = One way direct causal relationship
  = Indirect causal relationship
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Imprisonment is also found to be Granger cause GDP for robbery, housebreaking and theft 
crime model. Labor force which is convicted and imprisoned will have negative effect in the 
GDP since the country lost the productive resources to the illegal industries. In housebreaking 
model, crime rates are the Granger cause for GDP while GDP Granger cause crime rates in 
robbery and theft model. This is best explained by the motivational effect of crime which is 
outlined in Becker (1968) for the case of robbery and theft in Sabah. On the other hand, 
housebreaking Granger cause GDP since most of the criminals will tend to engage in illegal 
industries while the country lost its productive resources in terms of labour force for the legal 
industries. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Unlike the existing recent work on economics of crime in Malaysia, which failed to 
incorporate any deterrence measure, this study is the first attempt at putting the analysis of six 
alternative types of crime in a temporal `causal’ framework using Sabahan data by binding 
the relationship between each type of crime and its economics and deterrence variables in a 
multivariate cointegrated system. The presence of cointegration between these variables tends 
to suggest that these eonomic and deterrent variables, along with alternative types of crime, 
are bound together by common trends (i.e.: have a long-run relationship). In other words, it 
can be said that although these cointegrated variables will have short-run or temporal 
deviations from their long-run common trends, eventually forces will be set in motion which 
will bring all the variables into the equilibrium (cointegrated) states. This finding of a long-
run temporal relationship between all these variables is very important for the policy 
designers. For more comprehensive analysis and thorough understanding of the economics of 
crime in Sabah for policy makers, this study also indicates the direction of that causation 
between the variables through the analysis of VECM.  
 
Results based on this recent methodology (cointegration, VECM and VDCs), generally 
shows that, although the relative importance of the determinants of crime varied by type of 
crime, of all the determinants it is GDP (a proxy for ‘economies wealth’), number of cases 
disposed by high court, imprisonment and recidivism appears to impact more or less on all 
the categories of crime significantly. Unemployment has the least effect of all and 
interestingly, same evidenced for unemployment was found by Masih and Masih (1996) 
while investigating Australian data in similar cointegration framework. While Sabahan crime 
rates are increasing, it also proves that the law and enforcement strategies do not have 
significant contribution in deterring crime since they are cointegrated in the long-run.  
 
Suggestions are that policy makers should understand the contributions of each crime 
categories and their response in respect to any precautionary measurement taken in order to 
reduce crime activities in Sabah. Increasing the police force alone is not enough of strategies 
to curb crime rates, economic and social improvements are also important. At the same time, 
it is the increase in police efficiency and knowledge is also imperative. Overall, the results 
seem to be quite plausible and intuitive. However, future studies utilizing police enforcement 
efficiency and strength are highly suggested.  
References 
Baharom, A. H. and Habibullah, M. S. (2009), “Crime and income inequality: the case of 
Malaysia”, Journal of politics and law, Vol. 2, pp. 55-70. 
Barlow, H.D. (1984), Introduction to Criminology, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 
Becker, G. S. (1968), “Crime and punishment: an economic approach”, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 76, pp. 1169-1217. 
Dolado, J., Jenkinson, T. and Sosvilla-Rivero, S. (1990), ‘Cointegration and unit roots’, 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 4, pp. 249-273. 
Ehrlich, I. (1973), “Participation in illegitimate activities: a theoretical and empirical 
investigation”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 38, pp. 521-565. 
Ehrlich, I. (1977), ‘The deterrent effect of capital punishment: Reply’, American Economic 
Association, 67, pp. 452-458. 
Granger, C. W. J. (1969), ‘Investigating causal relations by econometric models and cross 
spectral methods’, Econometrica, 37, pp. 424-438. 
Habibullah, M. S. and Baharom, A. H. (2009), “Crime and economic conditions in 
Malaysia”, International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 36, pp. 1071-1081. 
Hamzah, S.N.Z. and Lau, E. (2011), ‘Is Peniaphobia an Incentive to Crime?’, Global Crime, 
24, pp. 312-326. 
Johansen, S. (1988), “Statistical anlysis of cointegration vectors”, Journal of Economic 
Dynamics Control, Vol. 12, pp. 231-254. 
Johansen, S. and Juselius, K. (1990), Maximum likelihoos estimated and inference on 
cointegration with application to the demand for money, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 52, pp. 169-210. 
Kelaher, R. and Sarafidis, V. (2011), ‘Crime and Punishment Revisited’, MRPA, Paper 
No.28213. 
Kuperan, K., and Sutinen, J. G. (1998), ‘Blue water crime: Legitimacy, Deterrence and 
compliance inFisheries’, Law and Society Review, 32, pp. 309-338. 
Masih, A.M.M. and Masih, R. (1996), ‘Temporal causality and the dynamics of different 
categories of crime and their socioeconomic determinants: evidence from Australia’, 
Applied Economics, 28, pp. 1093–104. 
Meera, A.K. (1990), ‘Crimes’ Socio-Economic Aspects, A Case Study on Malaysia,’ Master’s 
Thesis at the International Islamic University, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
Meera, A.K. (1993), ‘The Economic Implications of Crime: A Case Study on the Malaysian 
Public Expenditures on the Criminal-Justice System’, Journal of Islamic Economics, 
3, pp. 33-59. 
Meera, A.K. and Jayakumar, M.D. (1995), ‘Determinants of Crime in a Developing Country: 
A Regression Model’, Applied Economics, 27, pp. 455-460. 
Moss, G. (1997), ‘Explaining the Absence of Violent Crime Among the Semai of Malaysia: 
Is Criminological Theory Up to the Task?’, Journal of Criminal Justice, 25, pp. 177-
194. 
Mustard, D. B. (2003), ‘Reexamining Criminal Behavior: The Importance of Omitted 
Variable Bias’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 85, pp. 205-211. 
R. F. Engle and C. W. J. Granger, (1987), “Cointegration and error-correction: representation, 
estimation and testing”, Econometrica, Vol. 55, pp. 251-276. 
Sidhu, A (2005), ‘The Rise of Crime in Malaysia: An Academic and Statistical Analysis’, 
Journal of the Kuala Lumpur Royal Malaysia Police College, 4, pp. 1-28. 
Sidhu, A (2006), ‘Crime Levels and trends in the Next Decade’, Journal of the Kuala Lumpur 
Royal Malaysia Police College, 5, pp. 1-13. 
Sims, C. (1972), ‘Money, income, and causality’, American Economic Review, 62, 540-552. 
Sims, C. (1982), ‘Policy analysis with econometric models’, Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 1, pp.107-152. 
Tang, C. F. (2009), ‘The linkages among inflation, unemployment and crime rates in 
Malaysia’, International Journal of Economics and Management, 3, pp. 50-61. 
Tang, C. F. (2011), ‘An exploration of dynamic relationship between tourist arrivals, 
inflation, unemployment and crime rates in Malaysia’, International Journal of Social 
Economics, 38, pp. 50-69. 
Withers, G. (1984), ‘Crime, punishment and deterrence in Australia: an empirical 
investigation, Economic Record, 60, pp. 176–85. 
Yik-Koon, Teh, (2008), ‘The Best Police Force in the World Will Not Bring Down a High 
Crime Rate in a Materialistic Society’, International Journal of Police Science and 
Management, 11, pp. 1-7.  
